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Abstract 
 
The UK Clinical Trials Regulations were amended in 2006 and 2008 to facilitate research on 
medicinal products administered in emergency situations. The Regulations, which implement 
the EU Clinical Trials Directive, had previously required prior consent to participation in a 
clinical trial from either the participant or the participant’s legal representative. These 
amendments put emergency research on medicinal products on a similar footing to research 
on other types of invasive emergency treatment. This article argues that this was a positive 
development from the perspective of science and society and one for which there is a strong 
ethical basis. Nonetheless, it is argued that the UK Regulations cannot be interpreted 
consistently with European law without distortion contrary to the rule of law. It is also argued 
that the Directive needs to be amended or replaced to ensure a proper balance between the 
interests of participants and the interests of science and society. A number of specific 
suggestions are made, and the proposals made by the European Commission in July 2012 are 
supported. It is, however, argued that more needs to be done to protect the conduct of 
emergency trials from the conflicts of interests and biases that generally beset clinical trials. 
Keywords 
Emergency research, medical research, Clinical Trials Directive, UK Clinical Trials 
Regulations, Mental Capacity Act 
 
Introduction 
 
Informed consent has long been accepted as an important safeguard for protecting the 
interests of participants in medical research. Consent was declared to be ‘absolutely essential’ 
by the first principle of the 1947 Nuremberg Code
1
 and this was only slightly qualified by the 
Helsinki Declaration of 1964 to permit research on an incapacitated patient with the approval 
of a legal representative.
2
 It was not until the fifth revision of the Helsinki Declaration in 
2000 that this was further modified to support research in an emergency situation where it is 
not possible to obtain consent from the participant or a proxy before entry into the trial.
3
 
 One of the largest trials of a new treatment in an emergency setting was the 
‘Thrombolysis in Cardiac Arrest (TROICA)’ study, which sought to assess the safety and 
efficacy of administering the drug tenecteplase during cardiopulmonary resuscitation of 
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1
  Reproduced as Appendix 1 to R. V. Carlson, K. M. Boyd, and D. J. Wedda, ‘The revision of the 
Declaration of Helsinki: past, present and future’, British Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 57 (2004), 
p. 695. 
2
  1964 version, II.1. Reproduced in Bulletin of World Health Organization 86 (2008), p. 652. 
3
  2000 version, para. 26. 
patients who had out-of-hospital cardiac arrest.
4
 This double-blind, multi-centre trial involved 
patients being given standard resuscitation with either tenecteplase or a placebo. This appears 
to have been a paradigmatic instance of a trial designed to resolve genuine clinical 
uncertainty over a new treatment for which it was not feasible to obtain the prior informed 
consent of the participants. It actually established a negative––this trial was ended 
prematurely after the results of the first 1000 patients detected no significant differences 
between the tenecteplase and placebo groups.
5
 Some clinical trials taking place in emergency 
settings have produced significant positive findings.
6
 
 This article considers the legal and ethical issues raised by research into emergency 
treatment for which prior informed consent is not feasible. This potentially concerns attempts 
to test the safety and efficacy of treatments in a wide range of sudden, incapacitating 
emergency situations. Such emergency situations could be created by, for example, cardiac 
arrest, severe stroke, anaphylactic shock, severe head injuries, or severed arteries. The United 
Kingdom has two closely related regulatory frameworks addressing emergency research of 
this type, depending on whether or not the trial involves the testing of a new medicinal 
product. This article examines both. It begins by examining emergency research involving 
medicinal products, arguing that the UK’s approach is at odds with European law. It is argued 
that future amendment or repeal of the EU Clinical Trials Directive (2001/20/EC) needs to 
rebalance the interests of research participants with others’ interests. A number of specific 
suggestions are made in this article as to the nature of this rebalancing and, in the process, 
support is offered for the proposals made by the European Commission in July 2012. 
Nonetheless, it is argued, that further consideration needs to be given to trialling a more 
radical proposal. 
 This article has four sections. The first analyses the UK’s regulatory approach 
towards emergency research involving medicinal products. It is shown that, in contrast to the 
UK’s approach and that of various international instruments, the Directive’s provisions leave 
no flexibility for defensibly dispensing with the need for prior consent before undertaking 
emergency research. In the second section, analysis of the UK’s regulatory position towards 
emergency research not involving medicinal products reveals a different approach to the 
interests of participants. The consequences of the regulatory distinction drawn between 
emergency research on children and on incapacitated adults are shown to contrast with the 
approach adopted by the Directive. The third section directly addresses the Directive’s 
adoption of the principle that the interests of the patient should always prevail over those of 
science and society. This principle is applied in the first section and shown in the second 
section to more closely reflect the Directive’s approach to incapacitated adults than to 
children. In the third section, this principle is shown to raise conceptual problems. The fourth 
section advances the view that many of the problems that generally beset clinical trials have 
particular relevance in the absence of the safeguard of informed consent, so extra care needs 
to be taken to ensure transparency, maximisation of the benefits of emergency trials, and the 
minimisation of factors that artificially magnify or protect the interests of persons other than 
the participant. Therefore, it is argued, there is an ethical case for trialling the radical 
response of centralising control over the design and implementation of emergency trials. 
                                                 
4
  F. Spöhr and others, ‘International Multicentre Trial Protocol to Assess the Efficacy and Safety of 
Tenecteplase during Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation in Patients with Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest: 
The Thrombolysis in Cardiac Arrest (TROICA) Study’, European Journal of Clinical Investigation, 35 
(2005), p. 315. 
5
  Böttiger, B.W. and others, ‘Thrombolysis during Resuscitation for Out-of-Hospital Cardiac Arrest’, 
New England Journal of Medicine, 359 (2008), p. 2651. 
6
  See, for example, CRASH trial collaborators, ‘Final results of MRC CRASH, a randomised placebo-
controlled trial of intravenous corticosteroids in adults with head injury—outcomes at 6 months’, 
Lancet, 365 (2005), pp. 1957–59 and CRASH2, http://crash2.lshtm.ac.uk (accessed 22 June 2012). 
 The regulation of emergency trials using medicinal products 
 
Clinical trials on medicinal products are regulated in the United Kingdom by a set of 
Regulations enacted in 2004 and subsequently amended: the Medicines for Human Use 
(Clinical Trials) Regulations 2004/1031 (hereafter referred to as the Clinical Trials 
Regulations). The amended Regulations are intended to give full effect to two EU Directives: 
the Clinical Trials Directive and the Good Clinical Practice (GCP) Directive (2005/28/EC). 
 The Clinical Trials Regulations, like the EU legislation that they implement, require a 
number of conditions to be satisfied before a person is entered into a clinical trial of a 
medicinal product that is either under development or used outside of its market 
authorisation.
7
 One of these conditions is that those who are entered into a clinical trial or 
their legal representatives must have given informed consent.
8
 Amendments introduced an 
exception to these conditions with regard to adults in 2006 (by Regulations 2006/2984) and 
with regard to children in 2008 (by Regulations 2008/941). Thus, there is now an exception 
to the need for prior consent where:  
 
1.   treatment is required urgently; 
2.   the nature of the trial requires urgent action;  
3.   it is not reasonably practicable to meet the relevant conditions of Schedule 1 
of the Regulations; and 
4.   the procedure adopted has received prior approval from an ethics committee.9  
 
This exception could clearly capture a trial like that of the TROICA study. Such a departure 
from the cornerstone of prior informed consent is supported by the International Committee 
on Harmonization (ICH) Guidance for Good Clinical Practice 1995
10
 and by the 2000 and 
2008 versions of the Helsinki Declaration. 
 The ICH guidance states that prior consent should be obtained if possible, but, when it 
is not possible, the enrolment of the participant should comply with the protocol and the 
applicable regulatory requirements, and have received prior approval from an ethics 
committee. Further, the participant or the participant’s legal representative should be 
informed about the trial as soon as possible and consent to continue should be requested. This 
guidance, therefore, envisages permissive national regulatory requirements of the type now 
enacted by the United Kingdom. 
 Paragraph 29 of the 2008 version of the Helsinki Declaration states that research on 
those incapable of giving consent, such as unconscious patients, may be performed without 
prior consent where four conditions are satisfied. These are: 
 
a. the physical or mental condition that prevents the giving of informed consent 
is a necessary characteristic of the research population;  
b. no legal representative is available and the research cannot be delayed;  
c. the specific reasons for using such participants have been stated in the 
research protocol and the study has been approved by a research ethics 
committee; and  
                                                 
7
  Reg. 2 (‘investigational medicinal products’). 
8
  Sch.1, Part 3, para 3 (adults able to consent or who have given consent prior to incapacity); Part 4, 
para. 4 (children); and Part 5, para.4 (incapacitated adults). 
9
  Sch.1, Part 1, para 1(6)–(7). 
10
  paras 3.1.7 and 4.8.15. See http://ichgcp.net (accessed 22 June 2012).  
d. consent to remain in the research should be obtained as soon as possible from 
the participant or legal representative.  
 
These four conditions are more specific than those in the ICH guidance and the first three 
present similar safeguards to the above listed 1–4 conditions of the UK Regulations. There is 
no direct equivalent of condition d, which is also a condition of the ICH guidance, in the four 
conditions of the Clinical Trials Regulations outlined above. Nonetheless, this could be 
considered to be implied by statements elsewhere in the Regulations to the effect that a 
participant with capacity, or the legal representative of a participant who lacks capacity, may 
withdraw from the trial at any time.
11
 
 The problem, however, is that the EU legislation that the Clinical Trials Regulations 
purport to implement does not contain an explicit exception to the need to obtain prior 
consent of the type expressed in the ICH guidance or the Helsinki Declaration. Article 3 of 
the Clinical Trials Directive states that the trial may only be undertaken if the participant or 
the legal representative ‘has had the opportunity, in a prior interview…to understand the 
objectives, risks and inconveniences of the trial’ and ‘has given his…consent after being 
informed of the nature, significance, implications and risks of the clinical trial’ (emphasis 
added). The past tense is similarly invoked by the Directive’s statement that a trial on 
children
12
 or adults who are not able to consent
13
 may only be undertaken if the informed 
consent of the legal representative ‘has been obtained’. And, if this were in any doubt, recital 
4 of the Directive declares that where the trial is to involve persons incapable of giving their 
consent, the written consent of their legal representative is necessary ‘before participation in 
any such clinical trial’. 
 
Dispensing with informed consent within the Directive 
 
Given the endorsement of the view that the requirement to obtain prior consent is not an 
absolute ethical requirement by the ICH guidance of 1995 and by the 2000 and 2008 versions 
of the Helsinki Declaration, can we not simply read an exception into the Directive’s 
apparently absolute requirement? Such an approach was suggested by the Medicines and 
Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) in its 2005 consultation on the UK 
Regulations.14 But, if this is to be a defensible interpretation of the legislation, it must at least 
be consistent with its provisions and fundamental principles.  
 As was suggested by the MHRA,
15
 the ICH guidance and the Helsinki Declaration are 
relevant to the principles of the Directive. Recital 6 of the Clinical Trials Directive cites the 
ICH as an example of ‘appropriate fora’ for pursuing the harmonisation of the technical 
requirements for the development of medicinal products and recital 8 of the GCP Directive 
declares that the ICH guidance should be ‘taken into account’. Similarly, recital 2 of the 
Clinical Trials Directive and Article 3 of the GCP Directive requires clinical trials to be 
conducted ‘in accordance’ with the Declaration of Helsinki. These provisions are, however, 
not as supportive of an implied qualification to the need for prior consent as they first appear.  
 The reference to the prior ICH guidance enables it to be taken into account, but this is not 
the same thing as treating the guidance as decisively laying down the goals of the Directive 
so as to permit departure from its clearly worded provisions. The references to the ICH 
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  Sch.1, Part 3, para 2; Part 4, para 3; and Part 5, para 3. 
12
  Article 4(a). 
13
  Article 5(a). 
14
  MHRA, Consultation on Amendment to the Medicines for Human Use (Clinical Trials) Regulations 
2004 (S.I. 2004/1031). MLX 326. 1 August 2005, at para 9. 
15
  MHRA, ‘Consultation on Amendment’. 
guidance in the recitals of the EU legislation are not sufficient to support deference to the 
guidance where it conflicts with the Articles of the Clinical Trials Directive. 
 The reference to the Helsinki Declaration goes further, but it is explicitly a reference to 
the 1996 version of the Declaration, which contained no provision for emergency research 
without prior consent. Indeed, paragraph 11 of that version of the Declaration requires the 
consent of the participant, providing for exception only in the following narrow terms: 
‘Where physical or mental incapacity makes it impossible to obtain informed consent, or 
when the subject is a minor, permission from the responsible relative replaces that of the 
subject in accordance with national legislation’. Further, a key provision of the 1996 version 
of the Helsinki Declaration asserts that ‘Concern for the interests of the subject must always 
prevail over the interests of science and society’.16 This is given effect by Articles 4(i) and 
5(h) of the Clinical Trials Directive, which provide that it is a condition of clinical trials on 
children and incapacitated adults that ‘the interests of the patient always prevail over those of 
science and society’.17 Interpreting these provisions as consistent with the legislation as a 
whole
18
 requires that priority be given to the interests of child and incapacitated adult 
patients, unless otherwise stated or implied by the legislation. 
 Dispensing with prior consent makes it possible to conduct some types of research in an 
emergency setting that would not otherwise be able to take place, and thereby advances the 
interests of science and society. But does it advance, or at least not weaken, the protection 
given to the interests of participants? This question is important, because, if it does not, then 
it cannot be permissible to interpret the Directive so as to read in an exception to the prior 
consent requirement, because to do so would be to ignore Articles 4(i) and 5(h).  
 In order to answer this question, we will consider the situation where there is scientific 
uncertainty over which of two treatments is better to administer in an emergency setting.
19
 In 
such a situation, the choice is between simply treating patients and conducting research to 
resolve the uncertainty. Thus, the options are: 
 
(1) the health care professional administering whichever treatment he or she believes to 
be better without research-related procedures,  
(2) entering the patient into a trial (in which one of these treatments is randomly chosen 
for administration) without consent/consultation, or  
(3) entering the patient into a trial with consent/consultation.  
 
Option 1 is simply emergency treatment and, as such, the health care professional is only 
concerned with that patient’s therapeutic needs. Options 2 and 3 involve emergency research 
aimed at producing generalisable knowledge and thereby involving the collection of 
information and the application of procedures beyond those directed to the patient’s 
therapeutic needs.
20
 In an emergency situation, it is generally neither feasible nor in the 
interests of patients to pursue option 3 by delaying treatment to consult with the patient or the 
patient’s proxy. This is because such treatments generally involve a narrow ‘therapeutic 
                                                 
16
  Declaration of Helsinki, 1996 version, I.5 (emphasis added). 
17
  Emphasis added. 
18
  In the 2008 version of the Declaration of Helsinki, which has a variant of this principle, the very first 
paragraph states that the Declaration is to be ‘read as a whole’ and each paragraph ‘should not be 
applied without consideration of all other relevant paragraphs’. Such an approach to any instrument is 
surely required if it is to be interpreted coherently. 
19
  See the discussion of ‘clinical equipoise’. 
20
  Common non-therapeutic interventions in emergency research include physical examinations, 
venepunctures, and review of medical records: see A. D. McRae and C. Weijer, ‘Lessons from 
Everyday Lives: A Moral Justification for Acute Care Research’, Critical Care Medicine, 30 (2002), 
pp.1146, 1148–1149. 
window’.21 For example, one study has shown that in the early stages of out-of-hospital 
cardiac arrest every minute of delay in providing defibrillation reduces the survival rate by 
over 20%.
22
 However, strictly treating the interests of the patient as always prevalent would 
favour option 1, because only that option is solely concerned with the patient’s therapeutic 
interests. The patient may have (non-therapeutic) interests that are opposed to departing from 
option 1, such as where the patient has previously expressed values or beliefs rejecting 
participation in research, or the additional tests and data collection that the research requires. 
Thus, treating the interests of the patient as prevalent does not support dispensing with prior 
informed consent so as to enter a patient into a clinical trial. Even if it did, the Directive’s 
invocation of this principle would not be a sufficient justification for reading an exception 
into the requirement to obtain prior informed consent. It is one thing to use a principle of the 
Directive to elaborate on matters left unaddressed or insufficiently detailed, and quite another 
to use it to override unambiguous provisions. 
 Between October 2009 and January 2010, the European Commission ran a public 
consultation on the operation of the Clinical Trials Directive.
23
 The consultation document 
noted that the information that needs to be provided prior to obtaining informed consent is 
‘extensive, covering several pages and lasting up to two hours’.24 It also noted that between 
the Directive coming into force on 1 May 2004 and the consultation, applications had been 
made for 532 emergency clinical trials to take place. It went on to state that, ‘This situation is 
not addressed in the rules for obtaining informed consent in the Clinical Trials Directive’.25 
This implicitly concedes that the prior consent requirement is an absolute requirement in the 
Directive. Despite this, 10 European Union countries have legislation permitting emergency 
research without prior consent.
26
 These countries are either in contravention of EU law or the 
Directive is to be interpreted contrary to its expressed terms and, as argued above, its 
principles. As indicated above, the MHRA took a different view when it sought amendment 
of the Clinical Trials Regulations to permit emergency research without prior consent.
27
 
According to its 2005 consultation, 
 
Whilst there are no specific provisions in the Directive allowing an exception from the general 
requirement of prior consent, we consider that the proposed exception is within the spirit of the 
Directive.
28
 
 
But, if the analysis above is sound, such an approach to the terms of the Directive involves 
the adoption of an unacceptable legal fiction.
29
 Lon Fuller has convincingly argued that the 
Rule of Law requires that the rules be non-contradictory and that there should be congruence 
between official action and declared rule.
30
 If the Directive is to be interpreted to permit an 
exception to prior consent on the basis that obtaining such consent is not feasible in an 
                                                 
21
  McRae and Weijer, ‘Lessons from Everyday’, at p. 1146. 
22
  V. J. De Maio et al. ‘Optimal Defibrillation Response Intervals for Maximum Out-of-Hospital Cardiac 
Arrest Survival Rates’, Annals of Emergency Medicine, 42 (2003), p. 242, 247. 
23
  European Commission, ‘Assessment of the Functioning of the ‘Clinical Trials Directive’ 2001/20/EC: 
Public Consultation Paper’. Brussels, 09/10/2009. ENTR?F/SF D(2009) 32674. 
24
  ‘European Commission’, p. 24. 
25
  ‘European Commission’, p. 25. 
26
  ‘European Commission’, p. 25. 
27
  MHRA, ‘Consultation on Amendment’. 
28
  ‘Consultation on Amendment’, para 9. 
29
  On the proper and improper use of legal fictions see M. Adcock and D. Beyleveld, ‘Purposive 
interpretation and the regulation of technology: legal constructs, legal fictions, and the rule of law’, 
Medical Law International, 8(4) (2007), p. 305. 
30
  L. Fuller, The Morality of Law, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969), at pp. 65–70 
81–91. 
emergency setting, then the Directive is self-contradictory and there is incongruence between 
the declared rule and how it is applied. 
 The European Commission’s consultation document advanced the view that ‘it should be 
a serious setback for clinical research if medicinal research in emergency situations proved to 
be impossible in Europe’. This is indeed true and such research is required to ensure that 
medical knowledge and treatment continues to advance.
31
 But it is a serious setback to the 
rule of law if inconvenient and unduly restrictive legislation may be ignored or given 
fictionalised interpretations. The better approach is to seek to accelerate its amendment or 
replacement. 
 The responses to the public consultation, published in February 2010, indicated that 
most accepted that the situation under the Clinical Trials Directive was ‘unsatisfactory’.32 
The Commission issued a further consultation in February 2011
33
 and, in July 2012, issued a 
draft regulation that it hopes will replace the Directive by 2016.
34
 This draft regulation 
proposes to dispense with prior consent in specified circumstances (to be examined in the 
course of the next section). It proposes to re-enact various other provisions, including a 
slightly reformulated version of the prevalence principle, which will be examined in the 
section entitled ‘The rights and interests of the participant’.  
 
Emergency trials of other types of invasive treatment, and the interests of incapacitated 
adults versus children 
 
Emergency research need not involve the testing of a medicinal product and, if it does not, it 
will fall outside of the Clinical Trials Directive and the implementing Clinical Trials 
Regulations. For example, consider a research trial of alternative cardio-pulmonary 
resuscitation techniques for heart attack victims.
35
 In England and Wales, such trials would 
need to comply with the requirements of the common law (in the case of children) or the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005 (in the case of those who are older than 16 years and lack 
capacity).
36
 The 2005 Act is also important to the application of the Clinical Trials 
Regulations to emergency research, because those Regulations do not specify when an adult
37
 
is to be regarded as ‘unable by virtue of physical or mental incapacity to give informed 
consent’.38 Adult patients are to be regarded as incapacitated when they fail to satisfy the 
two-stage capacity test in the 2005 Act.
39
 
 Below it will be shown that the differences between the common law and the 2005 
Act have significance for the lawfulness of emergency research and the result is that 
emergency research on children is far more problematic than emergency research on 
incapacitated adults. This approach will be contrasted with that adopted by the Clinical Trials 
                                                 
31
  There is, for example, a dearth of clinical trials in trauma care: I. Roberts et al. ‘Trauma care research 
and the war on uncertainty’, British Medical Journal, 331 (2005), p. 1094. 
32
  European Commission, ‘Assessment of the Function of the ‘Clinical Trials Directive’ 2001/20/EC: 
Summary of Responses to the Public Consultation Paper’. Brussels, 20 March 2010. SanCO/C/8/SF/dn 
D(2010) 380240, p. 14. 
33
  European Commission, Revision of the ‘Clinical Trials Directive’ 2001/20/EC: Concept Paper 
Submitted for Public Consultation. Brussels, 9 February 2011, SANC/C/8/PB/SF D(2011) 143488. 
34
  European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on 
Clinical Trials on Medicinal Products for Human use, and Repealing Directive 2001/20/EC. Brussels, 
17 July 2012. CoM (2012) 369 final. 
35
  See A. Hallstrom et al. ‘Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation by Chest Compression Alone or with Mouth-
to-Mouth Ventilation’ New England Journal of Medicine, 342 (2000), pp. 1546–1553. 
36
  In Scotland, the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 applies to those 16 or over (s. 1(6)). 
37
  Defined as someone who has attained the age of 16 years: Reg. 2(1). 
38
  Sch. 1, para 1(4)9a) 
39
  Ss.2 and 3, which are to be read in the light of the s. 1 principles. 
Regulations, which reproduce regulatory differences between children and incapacitated 
adults from the Directive that are, it will be argued, inappropriate in the context of emergency 
research. It will be further argued that the EU Regulation proposed by the European 
Commission offers a more coherent approach than that currently adopted by the UK 
Regulations. 
 
Research on children 
 
The common law position on research involving children is largely a matter of supposition, 
because of the paucity of case law. Outside of an emergency context, it is even unclear 
whether a researcher may rely on the consent of a child, because the legislation that permits 
the consent of 16 year old children to be regarded as an adult’s only applies to therapeutic 
and diagnostic procedures
40
 and there is doubt on whether it is possible to rely on satisfaction 
of the Gillick test.
41
 In an emergency setting, healthcare professionals may undoubtedly treat 
a child without the authorising consent of the child or parent,
42
 but there is no common law 
support for extending this to research. The Royal College of Paediatrics has opined that, 
provided that the project as a whole has been approved by an ethics committee, ‘it would be 
ethical to carry out research on children on such occasions of extreme urgency without 
obtaining consent’.43 It went on to accept that it is ‘possible’ that this would still be unlawful. 
With respect, this is more than a mere possibility, because the emergency exception as 
addressed in the case law is articulated as tracking the interests of the child. In Gillick, Lord 
Templeman expressed it thus:  
 
I accept that if there is no time to obtain a decision from the court, a doctor may safely carry 
out treatment in an emergency if the doctor believes the treatment to be vital to the survival or 
health of an infant and notwithstanding the opposition of a parent or the impossibility of 
alerting the parent before the treatment is carried out. In such a case the doctor must have the 
courage of his convictions that the treatment is necessary and urgent in the interests of the 
patient…44 
 
Thus, invasive research without prior consent on children is probably unlawful in England 
and Wales, unless the research falls within the Clinical Trials Regulations or the Mental 
Capacity Act (which does not apply to those under 16). 
 
The conditions applying to research under the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
 
The 2005 Act has specific provisions dealing with research on incapacitated adults to which 
the Clinical Trials Regulations do not apply.
45
 Such intrusive research must be part of a 
                                                 
40
  See s. 8(1) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969 and Re W [1993] Fam. 64, pp. 78 and 92. Compare: 
Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, ‘Ethics Advisory Committee Guidelines for the Ethical 
Conduct of Medical Research involving Children’, Archives of Disease in Childhood, 82 (2000), p. 
177, 180. 
41
  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech AHA [1986] A.C. 112 did not consider research and obiter in Re W 
[1993] Fam. 64, esp. p.78 expresses doubt about whether the consent of a child could authorise a 
serious non-therapeutic procedure that does not benefit that child. 
42
  Gillick [1986] A.C. 112, pp. 138, 181–182, 189, 200, 204. See also Children Act 1989, s. 3(5), which 
empowers those who have ‘care of the child’ but lack parental responsibility to do what is ‘reasonable’ 
to protect the child’s welfare. 
43
  College of Paediatrics and Child Health, n. 40 above, at p. 180. 
44
  Gillick [1986] A.C. 112, p. 180. Emphasis added. 
45
  Ss 30 to 34.  
protocol approved by a research ethics committee (REC).
46
 The REC must be satisfied that 
the research relates to the participant’s ‘impairing condition’ or its treatment,47 and that there 
are reasonable grounds for believing that the research cannot be done as effectively using 
those who have capacity.
48
 The REC must also be satisfied that the benefits justify the 
research in one of two ways. The first is where the research has the potential to benefit the 
participant without imposing on that person any burden disproportionate to the potential 
benefit.
49
 The alternative is where the research is intended to provide knowledge that will 
benefit those affected by the same or a similar condition, where there are reasonable grounds 
for believing that the risks to the participant are ‘negligible’, and the research will not 
significantly interfere with the participant’s freedom or privacy, or be unduly invasive or 
restrictive.
50
  
 Some of the conditions imposed by the 2005 Act with regard to incapacitated adults 
differ from those imposed by the Clinical Trials Directive and the UK Regulations. The first 
condition is essentially similar to Article 5 of the Directive, which requires that the research 
be essential to validate data obtained in clinical trials on capacitated persons and relate 
directly to a life-threatening or debilitating clinical condition from which the incapacitated 
adult suffers.
51
 The two grounds addressing the benefits of the research differ more 
significantly. The Directive requires that ‘there be grounds for expecting that administering 
the medicinal product to be tested will produce a benefit to the patient outweighing the risks 
or produce no risks at all’.52 Thus, the second arm in the Directive refers to there being ‘no 
risks at all’ to the participant, whereas the 2005 Act is satisfied by the risks merely being 
‘negligible’. This variation in degree is potentially significant. Interestingly, the Directive is 
far more permissive with regard to research on children than either it or the 2005 Act are with 
regard to incapacitated adults. With regard to children, Article 4 of the Directive provides 
that there must be some direct benefit to the group of participants involved in the trial, the 
research must be essential to validate data obtained in clinical trials on capacitated persons, 
and the research must either relate directly to a condition from which the child participant 
suffers or only be capable of being carried out on children.
53
 Thus, for adults the research 
must be therapeutic or carry no/negligible risks to the participant, whereas for children the 
Directive only requires that the research benefit the group of participants as a whole and it 
does not require that the risks be non-existent or negligible.
54
 
 The approach of the Clinical Trials Directive to research on children contrasts with 
that of the European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine, on which the research 
provisions of the Mental Capacity Act are based.
55
 The Biomedicine Convention does permit 
research that is not expected to directly benefit the health of a participant who is unable to 
consent, but only ‘exceptionally’ where it is intended to benefit those with the participant’s 
condition or persons in the same age category, and entails only minimal risk and minimal 
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burden to the participant.
56
 Why does the Clinical Trials Directive have more permissive 
conditions for entering children into a research project? The European Commission has noted 
that it is particularly important that research takes place on children because they are not, 
biologically speaking, small adults and more than 50% of medicines used to treat children 
have not actually been tested on children.
57
 To this end, the European Union has enacted 
further legislation to encourage research on medicinal products for paediatric use.
58
 It is 
certainly the case that phase 1 trials of new medicinal products—i.e. small group trials of the 
safety and side effects of a new drug—can only take place on young children if it is 
permissible to rely on a benefit to the group of such child participants as a whole and 
permissible for the child participant to face a non-negligible risk. In contrast, many phase 1 
trials on adults may enrol adults who are able to consent and there is therefore no need to 
enrol incapacitated adults in such trials. But once we are testing a medicinal product in an 
emergency setting for which obtaining the prior consent of any participant is not feasible, it is 
necessary to test new drugs on both children and incapacitated adults. I therefore contend 
that, for research in an emergency setting, the conditions applying to the two groups should 
be consistent. This is not the approach adopted by the UK’s Clinical Trials Regulations, 
which have retained the conditions of the Directive specifying the risk/benefit requirements 
for research on children and incapacitated adults. The point is that, in an emergency context, 
there is no rationale for making the conditions for enrolling a child easier to satisfy than the 
conditions for enrolling an adult; and the distinction therefore cannot defensibly apply to 
emergency trials. 
 The EU Regulation proposed by the European Commission as a replacement for the 
Directive adopts a different approach than that of the UK Regulations. One of the conditions 
laid down for dispensing with prior consent in emergency situations by the draft Regulation 
is that ‘the clinical trial poses a minimal risk to, and imposes a minimal burden on, the 
subject’.59 This fully addresses the points made above and will bring the EU legislation in 
line with the Biomedicine Convention’s approach to emergency research. 
 
Other conditions applying to emergency research 
 
In addition to the conditions outlined above, the 2005 Act requires researchers to consult with 
the participant’s carer or, if the researcher is unable to identify such a person after taking 
reasonable steps to do so, a nominated independent person.
60
 This consultation is to take 
place before the start of the trial,
61
 and the participant is not to be entered into the trial if the 
person consulted advises that the participant’s wishes and feelings would be likely to have 
led him or her to decline to take part in the project. If applied strictly, this consultation 
requirement would effectively prevent emergency research of the type considered in this 
article, but the Act does provide for an exception. The exception applies where urgent 
treatment is provided and the researcher considers it necessary to take action for the purposes 
of the research as a matter of urgency and not reasonably practicable to consult.
62
 The 
researcher must also have the agreement of an independent doctor or, where that is not 
reasonably practicable, the protocol to this effect must have been approved by an REC.
63
 The 
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procedure for dispensing with prior consultation is thus very similar to that in the Clinical 
Trials Regulations for dispensing with prior informed consent. The essential difference is the 
reference to the agreement of an independent doctor, as there is no such procedure offered as 
an alternative to prior informed consent in the UK Regulations. There is similarly no such 
additional procedure proposed for the draft EU Regulation. 
 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 does not apply to Scotland, but the Adults with 
Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000 has very similar provisions addressing emergency research. 
This Act generally requires the consent of the guardian or welfare attorney, or the adult’s 
nearest relative.
64
 An exception applies where it is not practicable to contact such a person 
before entry into the trial, and consent has been obtained from either the participant’s doctor 
or a nominated independent person.
65
 A further exception applies where it is not reasonably 
practicable to obtain the consent of any of these persons where: the treatment provided in the 
research is a matter of urgency, it is necessary to take action for the purposes of the research 
as a matter of urgency, and the research has been approved by a research ethics committee.
66
 
Like the Mental Capacity Act, the Scottish Act provides for an additional situation between 
those in which it is possible to get the prior consent of a proxy and situations in which it is 
not possible to consult with or get consent from persons outside of the trial. 
 The EU Regulation proposed by the European Commission permits research where 
the urgency of the situation, caused by a sudden serious medical condition, makes it 
impossible to obtain prior informed consent.
67
 The participant must not have previously 
expressed objections known to the researcher and informed consent must be obtained as soon 
as possible. 
 Once the EU Regulation is in force, the United Kingdom will have a coherent 
approach to emergency research involving medicinal products and emergency research 
falling within the 2005 Act. Further legislative intervention, or judicial development of the 
common law, will be required to bring emergency research on children that does not involve 
medicinal products in line with these developments. 
 
The rights and interests of the participant 
 
The earlier analysis of the Clinical Trials Directive addressed its adoption of the principle 
that the interests of ‘the patient’ should ‘always prevail’ over those of science and society. 
The 2005 Act similarly declares in relation to research on incapacitated adults falling within 
its provisions that ‘[t]he interests of the person must be assumed to outweigh those of science 
and society’.68 This principle, being so central to the regulatory frameworks considered 
above, stands in need of analysis. It will be argued that this principle raises conceptual 
difficulties and the formulation in the draft EU Regulation is to be preferred. 
 The above principle has its origins in the Declaration of Helsinki and has been expressed 
slightly differently in the various versions of that instrument. Its initial appearance as a 
declared principle was in the first revision of the Helsinki Declaration in 1975, where it 
appeared twice.
69
 It appeared as a basic principle (‘Concern for the interests of the subject 
must always prevail over the interests of science and society’)70 and as a principle of non-
therapeutic research (‘In research on man, the interest of science and society should never 
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take precedence over considerations related to the well-being of the subject’.)71 The wording 
of these statements remained unchanged through revisions of the Declaration in 1983, 1989, 
and 1996. These were reduced to a single provision in the fifth revision in 2000: ‘In medical 
research on human subjects, considerations related to the well-being of the human subject 
should take precedence over the interests of science and society’.72 In the latest version of the 
Declaration, adopted by the World Medical Association in 2008, this became: ‘In medical 
research involving human subjects, the well-being of the individual research subject must 
take precedence over all other interests’.73 Thus, the Helsinki Declaration no longer declares 
that all the interests of the participant should always prevail over the interests of science and 
society. Now, it simply requires that the well-being of the participant must take precedence 
over all other interests. This is potentially a significant evolution of the principle, but there is 
also shared essence between these formulations. 
 The principle in all of its formulations is clearly deontological in the sense that it does not 
permit the aggregation of the rights or interests of others to outweigh a more important right 
or interest possessed by the participant. The principle, as it was originally expressed in the 
Helsinki Declaration and remains expressed in the Clinical Trials Directive, does not permit 
the interests of the individual participant to be outweighed by the collective interests of 
science and society. The principle as it is now formulated in the Helsinki Declaration does 
not permit the well-being of the individual participant to be outweighed by collective 
interests of any type. This aspect of the principle is significant because the combined 
collective interests favouring entry of a person into a clinical trial could be considerable. The 
interests of persons other than the participant include the interests of researchers (it should 
not be forgotten that career progression and prestige often track research outcomes and 
publications),
74
 the company producing the new treatment to be trialled,
75
 future patients, and 
the scientific community. 
 The characterisation of a principle or theory as deontological is often misunderstood. 
Consider, for example, the view advanced by McCarthy that, 
 
 Those who subscribe to one or another of the deontological theories of ethics that draw inspiration 
from Immanuel Kant…contend that it is always and everywhere wrong to ‘use’ human subjects 
without their informed consent.
76
 
 
If this were correct, then deontological theories of ethics would have to reject all research on 
those unable to give their informed consent, whether or not it takes place in an emergency 
setting. But, while such a view is advocated by some deontological theorists,
77
 it is not 
implied by the fact that the theory is deontological in the sense defined above. Deontological 
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theories need not consider the rights/interests
78
 of a participant to outweigh any possible right 
or interest of any other, so that it is only permissible to enter a participant into a clinical trial 
where that person has waived the benefit of the relevant rights/interests by consenting.
79
 This 
is for two reasons. First, it does not automatically follow from the characterisation of a theory 
as deontological that it holds that all human participants in a clinical trial have equal rights 
and interests. The principle in the Helsinki Declaration does imply that all human participants 
have equal rights/interests, but other deontological positions could coherently hold that the 
rights/interests of some participants (typically, the permanently cognitively enfeebled) are 
sometimes less weighty than the rights of other participants.
80
 Secondly, the characterisation 
of a theory as deontological does not imply that a right/interest of an individual participant 
can never be overridden by a more important right/interest of another individual. To hold that 
the individual’s consent is the only permissible justification for participation in a clinical trial 
is to hold that others can never have more important conflicting rights, which implies that 
either research participants are a special category of person with greater rights/interests than 
members of other groups or the participant’s most important rights/interests are always 
violated by non-consensual participation in a clinical trial. The first of these alternatives 
would be misguided because participating in research does not magnify an individual’s 
intrinsic moral status; an individual does not get more rights or more important rights by dint 
of entry into a trial. The second is too encompassing because participation in a clinical trial 
does not invariably threaten the most important interests of the participant. This will depend 
on the nature and purpose of the trial, including the risks that are faced by the participant. 
 Many theorists insist that participation in a clinical trial, at least of those who are unable 
to consent, should only take place where there is ‘clinical equipoise’, wherein there is a 
legitimate division of opinion within the scientific community on whether one treatment 
(typically a proposed experimental treatment) is more efficacious than another (typically the 
conventional treatment) and the evidence is insufficient to adequately resolve the matter.
81
 
Even where there is clinical equipoise, the patient could still have an interest in not being 
entered into a clinical trial. Participation in the trial could be contrary to the patient’s 
previously expressed views and values (e.g. the patient could have expressed strong 
opposition to clinical trials as such or to something that is an inherent part of the specific 
clinical trial) and participation will inevitably involve some risk for the participant: ‘[a]ll 
clinical research includes non-therapeutic interventions that place the subject at risk with no 
prospect of direct benefit’.82 As was highlighted earlier, trial designs that are intended to 
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produce generalisable knowledge are therefore not restricted to the therapeutic needs of the 
specific patient nor can everyone be assumed to accept the need for their participation in 
emergency research with its attendant non-therapeutic procedures and data collection. 
Nonetheless, not all deontological theories will hold that any possible interest possessed by 
the patient will automatically override the interests of all others potentially affected by the 
trial. 
 Even where the participant has the ability to consent, a powerful argument can be made to 
the effect that there may sometimes be a moral duty to participate in some types of 
research;
83
 which is not to say that such a duty should be legally enforced. The conditions for 
the imposition of moral duties to assist those in need have been fully explored in the 
literature, from both deontological and utilitarian perspectives.
84
 The generally accepted 
conditions are: (1) the assistance must be required to protect another’s important interests; (2) 
the person on whom the burden of assistance falls must be in a position to assist; (3) the 
assistance must not impose an unreasonable burden; and (4) the persons requiring assistance 
must not be in a position to self-assist. A clinical trial that is well designed to test the safety 
and efficacy of a potentially life-saving therapy will clearly satisfy the first two and last of 
these conditions, and those imposing only negligible risk on the participant will surely also 
satisfy the third condition. In such circumstances, it cannot be the case that the interests of the 
participant are overriding. If this analysis is correct, it surely follows that to hold that a 
person who is able to consent can never have a moral duty to participate in a clinical trial is 
effectively to reject all positive duties. That is because if it is accepted that satisfaction of 
these four conditions gives rise to positive duties, then there must sometimes be a positive 
duty to participate in some types of medical research. 
 While the Directive’s prevalence principle shares the deontological basis of the 
formulations of the principle in the Helsinki Declaration, it is expressed in a stricter form 
than the 2008 version of the Declaration. Requiring that the interests of ‘the patient’ should 
‘always prevail’ over those of ‘science and society’ is more demanding than requiring the 
‘well-being’ of the ‘research subject’ to take ‘precedence’ over ‘all other interests’. Patients 
include those who have not been entered into a clinical trial, whereas research subjects do 
not. The interests of the patient are potentially wider than the well-being of the individual, 
and thereby include privacy and non-experiential interests.
85
 There is no ambiguity in 
concluding that an interest that always prevails is a conclusive consideration; whereas 
something could plausibly be said to take precedence where it is simply given the first and 
most serious consideration without being unequivocally overriding. The Directive’s 
prevalence principle is therefore particularly open to the criticism that it unduly elevates the 
interests of actual and potential participants. The only limit on the prevalence of the 
participant’s interests recognised by the Directive are those contingently accepted by the 
participant or the participant’s legal representative when they provide prior consent. This 
means that the prevalence principle potentially goes far beyond ensuring that the researcher’s 
professional interests and the pharmaceutical company’s commercial interests do not take 
priority over the most important human rights of each participant. 
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 In the Regulation proposed by the European Commission, the prevalence principle has 
been re-worded to become: ‘The rights, safety and well-being of the subjects shall prevail 
over the interests of science and society’.86 This move from ‘the interests of the patient’ to the 
‘rights, safety and well-being of the subjects’ is to be commended as a move away from a 
presumption against research. The reformation of the principle continues to treat the (now 
specified) interests of participants as automatically overriding the ‘interests of science and 
society’, which on the face of it remains problematic even within a deontological perspective. 
There are, however, two important counter points. First, the principle is to be regarded as 
subject to the other provisions of the draft Regulation, because the Regulation would 
otherwise be contradictory. In particular, the prevalence of the participants’ rights, safety and 
well-being must be regarded as consistent with the conduct of emergency research in 
accordance with the terms of the Regulation. Secondly, there is an alternative justification for 
requiring the participant’s interests to be treated as if they were prevalent even if they do not 
strictly have this weight. This alternative justification rests on the precautionary principle that 
it is better to over protect the rights of participants than to under protect them. This principle 
would support treating the rights of participants as if they were prevalent to remove the 
opportunity for abuse created by attempts to specify circumstances in which their rights may 
be overridden. Thus, the draft Regulation’s prevalence principle can be defended. This is 
important, because the prevalence principle has wider implications than is commonly 
recognised. 
  
Ensuring a proper balance of the interests of participants and other interests in the 
absence of prior consent 
 
The draft EU Regulation proposes to remove the safeguard of informed consent to permit 
emergency research. One benefit of the prior consent requirement, however, is that it enables 
account to be taken of the participant’s views, values, and preferences and thereby serves to 
reduce the likelihood that the participant’s interests will be overlooked. Thus, extra care 
needs to be taken to ensure that whatever rights/interests participants have are properly 
overridden by competing rights/interests, the benefits of the research are maximised, and that 
factors that artificially magnify or protect the interests of persons other than the participant 
are minimised. The many factors that are likely to distort the balance between the interests of 
the participant and the interests of others are, therefore, of particular importance in the 
context of emergency research. 
 One factor that needs to be addressed in this context is the ‘sponsorship bias’. This 
refers to pharmaceutical funding being associated with the production and publication of pro-
industry results in clinical trials.
87
 The bias produced by commercial conflicts of interest has 
been reported to influence the design of trials (such as by the choice of comparators, dosages, 
protocols, or trial durations)
88
 and their reporting (such as the selection of which trials to 
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submit for publication and, when a trial is selected, use of a ghost-writer whose authorship is 
not declared or a guest author who has not conducted the research).
89
 According to Angell,  
 
companies are involved in every detail of the research—from the design of the study through 
analysis of the data to the decision whether to publish the results. That involvement has made 
bias not only possible but extremely likely.
90 
 
Many potential remedies for sponsorship bias have been suggested in the literature, some of 
which would need to operate at a regulatory level. One of the most widely recommended is 
the establishment of a public registry of all clinical trials,
91
 which the European Union has 
recently sought to implement. 
 The EU Clinical Trials Register was launched by the European Medicines Agency in 
March 2011.
92
 This online register grants public access to information on clinical trials of 
medicinal products authorised under the Clinical Trials Directive. At the time of writing, this 
register contains the details of over 18,000 clinical trials, derived from the EudraAct database 
established by Article 11 of the Clinical Trials Directive. This registry should remove some 
of the distortion created by the non-publication of unfavourable trial results and enable 
detailed independent analysis of all registered trials. A register cannot, however, address all 
aspects and consequences of the sponsorship bias. It cannot, for example, directly affect the 
design of trials or prevent sponsors from arranging for articles to be submitted to journals 
reporting their clinical trials in the most favourable light, using ghost-writers and guest 
authors. A register does enable retrospective analysis of the effects of the sponsorship bias, 
but it does not address the distorting effect of the sponsor’s control over the details of the 
research. 
 Lewis and others have argued that ‘as long as drug companies retain primary 
responsibility for conducting or funding clinical trials, the trials will be sub-optimal from the 
standpoint of public health and safety’.93 They opine that the only way to eliminate 
sponsorship bias is by the adoption of a radical solution: removing the direct link between the 
clinical trial sponsor and the drug tester. They advance the view that clinical trials should not 
be directly funded or controlled by pharmaceutical companies; instead an independent public 
agency should be established to conduct the trials. They further propose, focussing their 
analysis on the US, that this body be funded by a tax on pharmaceutical companies. 
 This is a radical proposal. It would need to be properly trialled first and emergency 
research presents an ideal opportunity for such trialling in the UK, because (unlike many 
types of elective treatment) emergency treatment takes places within the National Health 
Service (NHS). In theory, such a system could be overseen by the recently established body 
that is intended to provide a one-stop-shop for research applications in the UK: the Health 
Research Authority.
94
 There are, however, many obstacles to central control over the conduct 
of clinical trials. For a start, it would require the support of the leading journals, because 
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otherwise pharmaceutical companies would simply submit for publication the results of trials 
conducted outside of this body’s control, perhaps even conducted outside of the EU. The 
biggest obstacle is that such a system would require concerted political support in the face of 
what may be anticipated as powerful lobbying from the pharmaceutical industry. There are 
no indications that such support exists in the UK, let alone the EU as a whole. 
 The reality is that the Clinical Trials Directive was ‘industry-led’ in the sense that its 
principal purpose was to make conducting clinical trials in Europe more attractive to 
researchers and their sponsors.
95
 There is already a view that the Directive has unduly 
hindered research. The 2011 report of the Academy of Medical Sciences (AMS) declared that 
the Directive has actually ‘increased the administrative burden and cost of clinical trials for 
both non-commercial and commercial sponsors with no discernible improvements to patient 
safety or to the ethical basis of clinical trials’.96 Further, the AMS opines, the UK has 
aggravated this problem because the Clinical Trials Regulations so closely reflect the 
wording of the Directive as to amount to a ‘more robust and rigorous interpretation’.97 It was 
shown above that that this view is not borne out by the UK’s response to emergency trials. It 
is therefore perhaps not surprising that the 125 page AMS report barely mentions emergency 
research, save for citing as an example of delay the significant time that it took for NHS 
approval to be obtained for a recent multicentre trial comparing two types of emergency 
intervention for ruptured aortic aneurysm.
98
 In response to the AMS report, the UK 
government has indicated that it will seek ‘to further reduce burdens on industry’ in EU Level 
negotiations.
99
 It is therefore unlikely that the UK would support a radical solution to the 
problem of sponsorship bias. This is unfortunate because the distorting effect of this bias can 
only be eliminated by a radical rethinking of the relationship between the interests of 
pharmaceutical companies and the interests of participants, future patients, and science.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has argued for reform of the EU legislation addressing emergency research on 
medicinal products and supported the relevant provisions of the Regulation proposed by the 
European Commission in July 2012. It has, in particular, defended an exception to the prior 
consent requirement, removal of the conditions that favour conducting emergency research 
on children over incapacitated adults, and a reformulation of the principle stating the terms of 
the relationship between the interests of the participants and the interests of science and 
society. The replacement of the Clinical Trials Directive will not, however, fully address the 
distortions that potentially undermine the proper balance between the interests of participants 
and others. The prevalence principle, and the precautionary principle argued to underpin it in 
‘The rights and interests of the participant’ section, require that we at least trial more radical 
policies specifically directed at the distorting influence of the commercial interests of 
pharmaceutical companies. Such policies are particularly important in the context of 
emergency research given the prospective removal of the safeguard of informed consent. 
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